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ABSTRACT 
Product piracy poses an existential threat to many companies. Juristic property rights, which are currently dominantly put to 
practice, do not suffice to combat this threat. The rise in cases of piracy and the increasing professionalism of the 
counterfeiter, give grounds for effective methods of prevention. Based on the gap of existing approaches identified we 
evaluate how knowledge modeling could help to design preventive measures. We develop a novel approach which makes 
information and knowledge leaks transparent, analyzable and controllable. The approach is based on modeling the 
interactions and transfers of information and knowledge between departments of a company with internal and external 
business partners. For this purpose, a modeling process for knowledge-rich business interactions is used and modified for the 
specific purpose. Choosing dynamic assessment questions allows to on the one hand establish the level of risk of information 
and knowledge on piracy and on the other hand to prioritize measures specific to a company. In addition, the procedure 
reappraises companies’ existing modes of prevention. Based on this analysis, the method helps to develop and rank measures 
to hinder the theft of information by pirates. The introduced approach fills the gap in known concepts of protection, which are 
used only after a case of piracy has taken place. The approach also adds a new perspective in knowledge management. 
Keywords: modeling, knowledge activities, protecting knowledge, chinese walls, evaluation of knowledge  
PRESENT STATUS: PROBLEM PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING 
Knowledge Management typically focuses on the identification and sharing of knowledge among groups of people, e.g. the 
employees of a company with the ultimate goal to increase process efficiency and quality of results. However, there are 
downsides in making knowledge freely available, even within closed groups or among the value chain. This is not only the 
risk of information overload (Eppler and Mengis, 2004), but also the potential of knowledge misuse or product 
counterfeiting, which has not been respected within the discussion of knowledge management so far. 
Nevertheless product piracy or counterfeited products have become commonplace (Barboza, 2009; OECD). Often the term 
product piracy is used to describe a mixture of counterfeiting and piracy. Counterfeiting aims to imitate the original and 
disrespects trademarks, copyrights or patents. Often the producers use their own name as authorship. Knockoffs and 
Nearbrands often refer to gray market plagiarism and may be legal. Piracy refers to the stealing of brand names, the 
producers claim different authorship, as for example brand piracy (Neemann, 2007; Jacobs, Samli and Jedlik, 2001). Product 
piracy has meant severe financial consequences for companies, whose products or brands have been copied (OECD; 
Chaudhry and Zimmermann, 2009). On the one hand, a company directly loses in turnover and earnings, on the other hand 
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the image of a company may suffer on account of cheap copies or potentially face legal claims (OECD). The buyer also does 
not necessarily profit from their purchase. Although, the price may be lower, pirated versions will typically have inferior 
insurance through guarantees or accountability by the producers. In many cases, pirated copies are qualitatively worse which 
may lead to additional damage for the brand. If for example, fake spare parts are used in machines, there is a possibility that 
the entire machine will be damaged. Furthermore, security problems can arise, up to a life-endangering level, when copies are 
implemented, often unknowingly, as shown by reports of brake pharmaceuticals (Fenoff and Wilson, 2009). 
Product piracy has progressed enormously due to increasing levels of organization of counterfeiters and growing profitability 
(Jacobs, Samli and Jedlik, 2001). Various studies estimate the damage caused by piracy as between five and nine percent of 
the trade volume (Jacobs, Samli and Jedlik, 2001; International Chamber of Commerce, 2007). 
The motivation for the forger is the absorption of profits in the short term (Jacobs, Samli and Jedlik, 2001; Staake, and 
Fleisch, 2008). The profit probability is increased by (illegally) taking advantage of services, especially those which in the 
life cycle of a product are immediately connected to production. Counterfeited products evade the cost of product 
development whereas pirated products additionally avoid the costs of market launch as well as warranty, liability and other 
post sale services (Staake, and Fleisch, 2008) . Accordingly, the products most affected by piracy are those for which the 
markup on production costs for development and profit is especially high. This is often the case for spare and wear parts, 
which sometimes even serve to subsidize primary products (for example, printers which are sold under value and the 
matching, expensive ink cartridges which generate the profit). For the producer of the original product the time at which the 
pirate product is introduced onto the market is key; the later this happens, the smaller is the financial loss. 
In this contribution we focus on starting points for the acquisition of know-how of the Forgers: these are the finished 
products, which are analyzed through reverse engineering, but also any attainable information, know-how and the knowledge 
holders themselves. To obtain missing knowledge, any freely available information may be of value, as well as that which is 
acquired through tricks, under false pretenses or even through industrial espionage. 
Enterprises are Tied in Value Webs 
Taking this into consideration, the point of departure for our deliberations are in particular the relationships between 
companies and the fact that producers are today often involved in complex value added networks. For this purpose, 
information and knowledge and in some cases even corporate secrets are shared to varying degrees (Normann, and Ramírez, 
1993). For example, the exchange of information throughout a supply chain, including suppliers, logistics service providers 
and customers, are automated using IT-systems (Hendricksa, Singhalb, and Stratman, 2007). An enterprise’s intellectual 
property can be attacked at many points along the chain. This was confirmed by a qualitative appraisal of six companies in 
context of the method development. The assertion was reached by semi-standardized depth interviews to the issue of product 
piracy, in which vulnerable relationships to employees, competitors, certification bodies, consultants, and so on where 
identified, where in the past there had been suspicions of malpractice. These theoretical considerations and the explorative 
approach have lead to a checklist of over 20 categories of network partners. From the company’s point of view these can be 
marked as information or knowledge receivers. The network environment of an enterprise therefore creates the conceptual 
basis of our approach to control the outflow of know-how. 
Known approaches to stop product piracy 
A multitude of measures have been proposed to eliminate or reduce as far as possible the threat of product piracy. None of 
these have singularly been able to guarantee complete safeguarding. In the past, the main focus was on legal safety measures, 
especially securing industrial property rights; however these can only provide sanctions against cases of piracy which have 
already occurred. Particularly in the early phases of product development, securing property rights is difficult due to costs 
and enforced disclosure, for example when obtaining patents (Berrier, 1996). For this reason, it has become increasingly 
important for enterprises to systematically confront information and knowledge outflow. However, there still exists 
considerable mystification concerning the breadth of the information which is made available as part of regular business 
activity and about which information is worth safeguarding. 
Fig. 1. exemplarily shows known approaches to impede product piracy by the three areas “juristic”, “organizational” and 
“technical” (OECD; Neemann, 2007; Jacobs, Samli and Jedlik, 2001; Staake, and Fleisch, 2008). It further shows whether an 
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approach is preventative or whether it comes into effect after a case of piracy has occurred (marked “piracy occurs” on the 
axis “time of effectivity”). The security concepts marked in color in Fig. 1. are influenced by the method introduced in this 
contribution. The goal is to safeguard a company already before a case of piracy has occurred and accordingly integrate the 
means of defense into the company’s business strategy. 
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Fig. 1. Examples of approaches to the prevention of product piracy 
KNOWLEDGE MODELING TO PREVENT UNWANTED KNOWLEDGE LEAKS 
In knowledge management research modeling is widely used for visualization and design for both, knowledge and 
information flows as well as business processes and actor interactions. This is reflected by various approaches to business 
process oriented knowledge management (Heisig, 2003; Gronau and Weber, 2004; Woitsch and Karagiannis, 2005). Here we 
evaluate how these approaches could help in preventing unwanted knowledge leaks. As a starting point we chose the 
Knowledge Modeling and Description Language (KMDL) (Gronau and Weber, 2004b; Fröming, Gronau and Schmid, 2006) 
for its ability to reflect individual tacit knowledge as well as its view of knowledge activities. KMDL is an approach to 
process oriented knowledge management, which, analogous to business process management, analyses actual processes and 
draws up set-point processes. Contrary to classical approaches of business process modeling, KMDL focuses not only on 
procedural and information aspects but also on personal knowledge. The original goal of KMDL is the improvement of 
processes through the conception of demand-oriented measures using the knowledge management method. Semi-formal 
models are used to visualize and analyze processes. In particular by modeling the activity view, which shows concrete tasks 
within business processes, the information and knowledge transfers which are informal and often run laterally to the specific 
business processes become transparent. 
Information and knowledge interfaces 
The method and modeling language of KMDL is used for illustrating information and knowledge transfer relationships in 
business networks. To meet the demands of the relationships here in question, the concept of information and knowledge 
interface (IKI) was developed. For this purpose, all knowledge related activities are shown in a model (as seen in Fig. 2). 
Individual activity with a common receiver are combined into one IKI. The IKI therefore describes the mono-directional 
transfer of information and knowledge to this receiver. 
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Fig. 2. Individual knowledge activity as elementary component of an IKI 
For the specific case of product piracy new assessment and analysis procedures had to be developed. The thereby developed 
actions are introduced in the method description (Phase 4). The essential difference between the original use of KMDL and 
this one is the change in the objectives of analysis and evaluation, because the access to flows of information and knowledge 
is now to be hindered and not facilitated. Further differences exist in the type of questioning. In the process analysis with the 
goal of improving information and knowledge flow, it is wise to question all of the sides involved. In the case of product 
piracy this is not possible, because pirates cannot be assumed to give reliable answers. For this reason, the questioning 
focuses on those parts of an enterprise that are responsible for the transfer of information and knowledge 
For the administration of these actors a hierarchical model of actors is used. In this way, the company can be depicted with its 
departments as well as with its suppliers and customers. By hierarchical depiction of the entire environment and the 
organization of teams, assertions can be made on type level, as for example the transfer of information to suppliers. By 
further dividing (refining) supplier relationships, as for example cases where cooperation in development exists with the 
suppliers and therefore additional information is passed on, specific exceptional cases can be singled out. 
CONCEPTION OF AN ANALYSIS AND CONTROL PROCEDURE FOR FLOW OF INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE 
RELEVANT TO PRODUCT PIRACY 
The IKI analysis method is described in a procedure model (see Fig. 3. ). This procedure is generic and when applied in a 
company leads to specific IKI models. In the following, the individual steps are explained and supported with examples. 
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Fig. 3. Procedure model for the analysis and control of information and knowledge flows 
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In Phase 1 information and knowledge interfaces of an enterprise are identified. For this purpose, the entire life cycle of a 
product, from development until it reaches the customer, is taken into consideration. This is assisted by the checklist of the 
typical classes of receivers. The hierarchical model of actors is developed simultaneously. 
In Phase 2 the actual appraisal of information knowledge transfer per interface occurs. For the actual appraisal, interviews 
are conducted with the actors on the sender side. “Generalists”, such as managers and “specialists” are questioned in detail 
about the individual interfaces using a semi-standardized questionnaire. Three phases in the life cycle of a relationship 
between sender and receiver are identified: the phases of initiation, duration and termination of contact. Fig. 4. shows 
exemplarily modeled sections of interviews, which are combined into an IKI. In the example (Initiation phase) a printed 
version of a work piece is passed on to a supplier in order to obtain a quote. 
 
Phase of Lifecycle Conversion of information and knowledge interface 
Initialisation TeamPurchase Request for offer TeamSupplier
Component 
drawing
Component 
drawing  
Fig. 4. Example of modeled elements of IKI 
 
The modeled IKI are the basis for the following evaluation in Phase 3, the measures of evaluation are: 
─ The information and knowledge transferred at an interface have differing criticality. The level of criticality is 
established by core know-how, singularity and reproduction relevancy. For each risk factor there exists a series of 
specific evaluation questions. 
─ The existing security concepts are identified by questions regarding accessibility, copy and reproduction possibilities 
and traceability of a transfer. 
The evaluation is conducted by the actors taking part in a specific action. As this means that actors have to evaluate their 
personal engagement in an action, the Likert scale is employed for measuring purposes. The scale of assessment has two 
extreme values: “Completely agree” and “Completely disagree” as well as three evaluation possibilities in between. For the 
example given above, this means that after the information and knowledge leak is shown in the model (as seen in Fig. 4. ), 
the information and knowledge object is evaluated by a representative of the sender side. Fig. 5. shows the procedure for the 
evaluation of criticality using the example of the information object “Work piece drawing” specifically for the risk factor 
reproduction relevancy. 
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Fig. 5. Example of evaluation of criticality 
 
In the analytical phase 4 the criticality is established through questions to all three risk factors: know-how, reproduction 
relevancy and singularity. The aspects worth safeguarding are distinguished with use of the bottom-up list arrived at by this 
method. When the critical elements regarding product piracy in a company have been identified, those internal or external 
actors with access to these elements are determined. Therefrom is deduced the relative distance to access of critical know-
how. The evaluation is shown in Fig. 6. Receivers are marked in relationship to the critical know-how, to which there is a 
connection. For our example, the information object “Work piece drawing” was evaluated as highly critical. The receiver 
“supplier” therefore has access to information which can be classified as corporate secret. 
Team
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Public
Confidential
Corporate secret
Team
Supplier
Team
Public
 
Fig. 6. Interpretation of actor proximity [4] 
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A polar diagram additionally shows vulnerabilities of individual security concepts based on evaluation questions. It is 
possible to obtain further insights into deficits by contents and respective to individual information systems. 
The proximity analysis serves as the basis from which measures can be deduced. Set-point values are established for the 
actors on the list, resulting in a list of IKI, which need to be modified to reach set-point proximity. Simultaneously, the 
security concept can be improved by removing the identified deficits. 
As a result, there exists a series of measures regarding the security concept and the modified IKI. To each measure a value 
indicating the risk reduction can be applied by which implementation can be prioritized in Phase 5. In our example, one 
solution regarding the information object would be to only pass on excerpts or partially blurred drawings, in order to avoid 
further copying. Alternatively, the actor related solution could be to only make available drawings to specific suppliers with 
whom secrecy agreements have been made. 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Enterprises must meet the challenge given by product piracy with preventative measures. However, since there exists a lack 
of transparency regarding the flow of information and knowledge, the basis for creating sensible measures is missing. 
Furthermore, employees often lack understanding of which pieces of content need to be held secret. For this reason, well-
meaning but overly general proposals for safeguarding information remain ineffective. 
The proposed method leads to a bottom-up analysis of the contents disclosed at intersections and questions these from the 
perspective of possibilities for product piracy. For this purpose, disclosure of information and knowledge that takes place 
under regular business activity are taken into consideration. By evaluating criticality of information and knowledge and by 
reappraising existing security concepts know-how worthy of safeguarding can be identified. Finally, proximity analysis 
reveals whether individual groups of actors may have more access to critical contents than necessary. 
By means of this evaluation, measures are proposed based on the level of risk of product piracy. These serve the design of 
interfaces in the future and the improvement of security concepts. For instance, carriers of critical know-how can be tied to an 
enterprise for longer periods as preventative means. For companies, this creates an instrument with which information and 
knowledge flows can be controlled and measures for the avoidance of leaks can be implemented. A pilot run of the proposed 
procedure has already taken place in practice. A further development of the proposed method to define the set-point 
proximity of actors is currently in planning. 
Our current research interest focuses on actors that receive knowledge. We are working to develop an indicator based system 
to identify possible risks, e.g. those with a high probability for the actor to profit from counterfeiting. We expect 
improvements in the risk calculation by adding this additional information. Furthermore we plan to develop a calculating 
system that helps to measure which level of secrecy and protection is appropriate. 
Even though this work aims at limiting the distribution of information and knowledge, it still contributes to the domain of 
knowledge management because it provides for protective measures and thus helps enterprises to maintain their competitive 
advantage through knowledge. 
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